Recruitment Policy When Firms Observe Workers' Employment Status: an Equilibrium Search Approach by Carrillo-Tudela, C
November 2004
RECRUITMENT POLICY WHEN FIRMS OBSERVE
WORKERS’ EMPLOYMENT STATUS: AN EQUILIBRIUM
SEARCH APPROACH
Carlos Carrillo Tudela ∗†
Department of Economics, University of Essex
Abstract
This paper considers an equilibrium search model, where firms use information on a worker’s labour market
status when recruiting new hires, and all workers search for a job. We show that firms segment their work-
force in two. Unemployed workers are offered a lower wage than the workers they recruit from employment
in a competing firm even when these workers have the same productivity. The unique equilibrium is given
by the Diamond outcome in the market for unemployed workers and the Burdett and Mortensen (B-M)
outcome in the market for employed workers. We show that the offer and earnings distributions derived in
the model are first order stochastically dominated by the ones given in B-M and all workers are worse off.
We also show that in this environment information on employment status is sufficient for firms to obtain the
same profits as if they had complete information about workers’ reservation wages and outside offers.
Keywords: Search, wage dispersion, recruitment, discrimination.
JEL: J63, J64, J42, J71
∗Correspondence: Department of Economics, University of Essex, Wivenhoe Park, Colchester, CO4 3SQ; email:
cocarr@essex.ac.uk
†This paper is part of my PhD Thesis at the University of Essex. I would like to thank my supervisors Ken Burdett
and Melvyn Coles for their many useful comments and insights. I will would also like to thank Amanda Gosling,
Eric Smith and Adrian Masters for their comments. This paper has benefited from comments and suggestions of
participants in seminars at the University of Essex. Financial support was given by the UK Universities (ORS) and the
University of Essex Postgraduate Studentship. The usual disclaimer applies.
1 Introduction
A substantial and growing body of work establishes that unemployed workers are offered lower
wages than those who come from employment.1 Typical explanations based on human capital
theory and signalling models suggest firms use a worker’s unemployment history as a signal of
skill depreciation and react accordingly.2 This paper presents an alternative explanation: in the
presence of search frictions, firms use information on employment status to discriminate against
the unemployed but otherwise identical workers. Being unemployed reveals that the worker is at
the bottom end of the wage distribution, thereby firms will find it profitable to offer a lower wage.
Search frictions give firms monopsony power.3 Burdett and Mortensen (1998) (B-M) show this
can give rise to a continuous wage distribution. Firms trade-off profits per worker with the size of
their labour force when facing an upward sloping labour supply curve. Theoretical extensions and
empirical applications of this model abound.4
This theory rests on a crucial assumption: a firm has no information about its prospective
employees. Hence, it will always offer the same wage regardless of who knocks on its door.
1 See Farber (1999) and Kletzer (1998) for a survey on the cost of job loss using displaced workers data for the US
and Arulampalam (2001) and Gregory and Jukes (2001) for evidence using longitudinal data for the UK.
2 Manning (2003) puts through an alternative explanation using an equilibrium search model á la Burdett and
Mortensen (1998). Post-displacement earnings losses can be related to the depreciation of “search capital”. When
displaced, the worker losses his position in the earnings distribution and has to restart the search for “good” jobs from
the left tail of this distribution. Hence, his post-displacement expected wage would be lower than his pre-displacement
wage. This view is consistant with the observation that the average wage penalty faced by displaced workers after
a spell of unemployment on future earnings increase with pre-displacement tenure, experience and position in the
earnings distribution.
3 Bontemps, Robin and Van den Berg (2000) and Manning (2003) show evidence of firms’ monopsony power in
the presences of search frictions using French, UK and US data.
4 See Van den Berg (1999), Manning (2003) and Mortensen (2003) for interesting surveys and several applications.
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Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002) (PV-R) were the first to point out this issue and extended the B-
M model to an environment in which firms have complete information about their potential new
hires. Given contact, they observe the reservation wage of all workers and optimally engage in
offer matching when confronted with outside competition for their employees. All new recruits
are hired at their minimum acceptable wage. Workers are able to increase their wages in the
future by engaging their current employer with other potential ones into Bertrand competition.
When agents are homogenous, the wage offer distribution degenerates to a mixture of two mass
points: one at the common reservation wage and the other at the worker’s marginal productivity.
Heterogeneity is then required to restore a continuous wage distribution.
Many labour markets, however, do not appear to resemble these two extremes. Firms do dis-
criminate between potential employees by observable characteristics and rarely engage in offer-
matching. Asking a potential employee the details of his current employment contract is clearly
not a good strategy when this information is not verifiable. The present paper contributes to this
literature by extending the analysis to an environment in which workers possess some observable
characteristics that change over time. Firms condition their offers upon these characteristics, but
do not observe (or pre-commit not to counter-offer) any outside offer.
In our model firms post wages conditional on a worker’s employment status when recruiting
new employees, and all workers search for jobs. Unemployed workers are paid their reservation
wage. The wage offer and earnings distributions for this market degenerate to a mass point at this
wage. Once employed, the firm does not observe the details of a worker’s contract and offers the
same wage to any employed worker. The wage offer and earnings distributions are now described
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by B-M. This implies a foot-in-the-door effect that makes the unemployed accept a wage below the
opportunity cost of employment. The offer and earnings distributions are first order stochastically
dominated by the distributions in B-M, making all workers worse off. An important difference
compared to the previous models is that we predict a bimodal earnings distribution, which can be
used to test our theory empirically.
Furthermore, we show that when firms follow this recruitment strategy they obtain higher
profits than in the original B-M case and the same profits as in the PV-R homogenous agents
case. Hence, using information on employment status is always a better strategy than not using
it. More importantly, the equal payoff result implies that complete information is not necessary
for firms to extract maximum match rents when all workers search for jobs. Since the Diamond
outcome (see Diamond, 1971) appears in both environments, with complete information firms can
only extract these rents in the unemployed workers’ market. When discriminating by employment
status, competition for employed workers is not as fierce to drive profits in that market to zero.
Firms are then able to extract the first part of those rents when hiring the unemployed and the
second when hiring the employed.
The idea that firms can observe the worker’s labour market status is not new in search theory.
Vishwanath (1989) analyses an unemployed job search model in which firms have information on
the worker’s unemployment history and test the worker’s ability before deciding on a hire. The
implicit assumption, however, is that unemployment depreciates human capital. Her focus is to
show that “true” negative-duration dependance of the escape rate out of unemployment can arise
in a frictional environment. Lockwood (1991) follows a similar line of argument and analyses the
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corresponding equilibrium implications on a matching model. He shows that it is always in the
interest of firms to discriminate against the workers with sufficiently long unemployment spells.
In this paper we assume firms can only condition their offers on a worker’s labour market status
and not on its duration. Although including this dimension would enrich the model, the complexity
of the analysis increases considerably. Given that our aim is to provide an alternative explanation
of why firms might want to offer unemployed workers lower wages other than for productivity
reasons and to analyse the effects of this policy on the earnings distribution, we think this is a good
starting point. We do not know of any other study that addresses these issues.
In the next sections we describe the general framework and discuss the worker’s and firm’s
decision problems. In Section 5 we explain the nature of equilibrium and show the main results.
Section 6 develops comparisons between the model presented here and the ones of B-M and PV-R.
The last section concludes. All proofs are confined to the Appendix.
2 Basic Framework
Time is continuous and only steady states are considered. Suppose there is a unit mass of workers
and of firms who participate in a labour market. Workers and firms are homogeneous in that
any firm generates revenue p for each worker it employs per unit of time. Workers can be either
unemployed (u) or employed (e). Firms do not search for workers but post job offers at a zero
cost on a take it or leave it basis. Both unemployed and employed workers search for jobs. Let
0 < λ < ∞ denote the common Poisson arrival rate of these offers.5 For simplicity assume there
5 For simplicity and to facilitate later comparisions with the B-M and PV-R frameworks we focus on the special
case of equal arrival rates. However, the model can easily be generalised to the cases in which employed and unem-
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is no recall should a worker quit or reject a job offer.
A job offer is described by a single wage. Upon meeting, firms are able to observe the worker’s
current labour market status and condition their offers on this information. Let wi be the wage of-
fered to a worker in state i (where i = u, e) and Fi(wi) denote the distribution of wages posted
by firms in market i. An important assumption is that firms pre-commit not to counter-offer any
outside offer the worker might receive in the future. That is, this assumption rules out the possibil-
ity of Bertrand competition when a competing firm wants to poach an employed worker. Random
matching then implies Fi(wi) describes the probability a worker in state i receives a wage no
greater than wi. Let wi and wi denote the infimum and supremum of these distributions.
Firms and workers have a zero rate of time preference. Workers are risk neutral and finitely
lived, where any worker’s life is described by an exponential random variable with parameter
0 < δ < ∞. Note that δ also describes the inflow of new unemployed workers into the market.
Assume unemployed workers obtain b per unit of time and that p > b > 0. For any given Fu
and Fe that describe the wages posted by firms, the objective of any worker is to maximise total
expected lifetime utility. In the next section we show that the worker’s decision problem is a simple
generalization of an optimal stopping problem. Firms are also risk neutral but infinitely lived. The
objective of any firm is to choose a pair of wages {wu, we} such that it maximises expected steady
state profit flow given the optimal strategy of workers and the wages posted by other firms.
ployed workers receive offers at different rates or employed workers, in their first job, receive offers at different rates
than in subsequent ones, without changing the main results.
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3 Workers’ payoff and job search strategies
Let Vu(wu) denote the maximum expected lifetime utility of a worker employed at a wage wu given
he has been hired from unemployment and let Ve(we) denote the maximum expected lifetime utility
of the same worker at wage we given he has been hired from employment in a competing firm. The
no recall assumption and standard dynamic programming arguments imply the following Bellman
equations
δVi(wi) = wi + λ
∫ we
we
max[Ve(x)− Vi(wi), 0]dFe(x) for i = u, e. (1)
Similarly, define U as the lifetime expected payoff of an unemployed worker when following an
optimal search strategy in the future. The same arguments imply U satisfies
δU = b + λ
∫ wu
wu
max[Vu(x)− U, 0]dFu(x). (2)
As changing jobs is costless, employed workers will accept a wage offer if and only if it is
strictly greater than their current wage. Unemployed workers will accept a wage offer if and only
if it is at least as great as the reservation wage, wr. As Vu is increasing in w and U is independent
of it, wr is then defined by the intersection of Vu(wr) and U. Using equations (1) and (2) it is easy
to show that
wr = b + λ
[∫ wu
wr
[Vu(x)− Vu(wr)]dFu(x)−
∫ we
we
max[Ve(x)− Vu(wr), 0]dFe(x)
]
. (3)
Note that (3) implies an unemployed worker will accept a wage below (above) b when the
expected capital gains of receiving offers from Fe while he is in his first job are greater (less) than
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the expected capital gains of receiving offers from Fu while he is still unemployed.6 Given these
strategies lets now analyse the firms’ decision problem.
4 Firms’ payoff and optimal strategies
In what follows, assume that all firms will make acceptable offers to unemployed workers; i.e.
wi ≥ wr. It will be shown later that this assumption is satisfied in equilibrium. Given wr and
Fi we first characterise the relevant steady states in which the inflow of workers into a particular
state equals the outflow. Let µ denote the steady state number of unemployed workers. Note that
λ(1 − Fu(wr))µ describes the flow of workers out of unemployment and δ(1 − µ) describes the
inflow. Hence,
µ =
δ
δ + λ
.
Now consider the market for employed workers. Let Nu denote the steady state number of em-
ployed workers that were hired from unemployment. Note it consists of all unemployed workers
who received a job offer. Of these type of workers, define Gu(wu) as the steady state proportion
that are earning a wage no greater that wu.7 Hence,
Nu(wu) = NuGu(wu) =
λFu(wu)µ
[δ + λ(1− Fe(wu))] , (4)
describes the steady state number of workers hired from unemployment earning a wage no greater
than wu.
6 This result is similar to the one obtained in B-M when unemployed and employed workers receive job offers at
different rates. If unemployed workers receive offers less frequently than employed workers, they will accept a wage
w < b. By doing so they guarantee better future job opportunities.
7 Note that G(w) = G(w−) + m(w), where G(w−) is the steady state proportion of workers earning a wage
strictly less than w and m(w) is the mass of workers earning exactly w.
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By the same token, let Ne = (1 − µ) − Nu describe the steady state number of employed
workers that were hired from employment in a competing firm and define Ge(we) as the steady
state proportion of these workers that are earning a wage no greater than we. Steady state turnover
implies
[δ + λ(1− Fe(we))]NeGe(we) = λ
∫ w−e
wu
[Fe(we)− Fe(x)]dNu(x),
where the LHS describes the number of workers that flow out of employment at wages greater
than we and the RHS the number of workers that flow in. Note that the latter is made up of those
workers hired from unemployment earning a wage, x < we that received a wage offer greater than
their current wage but less than we. Hence,
Ne(we) = NeGe(we) =
λ
∫ w−e
wu
[Fe(we)− Fe(x)]dNu(x)
[δ + λ(1− Fe(we))] (5)
denotes the steady state number of workers hired from employment earning a wage no greater than
we.
Taking as given other firms’ wage offers as described by Fu and Fe and workers’ optimal search
strategies, any firm’s optimal strategy is then a pair of wages {wu, we} such that it maximises total
expected steady state profit flow,
Ω(wu, we) = Ωu(wu) + Ωe(we),
where Ωi(wi) denotes the expected steady state profit flow at market i when offering wage wi.
The no recall assumption, however, implies that the firm can maximise Ω(wu, we) by choosing wu
and we independently such that each wage maximises the corresponding Ωi(wi).8 Hence, define
8 As workers are able to observe the wages posted by firms in both markets upon a meeting, the no recall assumption
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Ωi = maxwi Ωi so that maximised total expected steady state profit flow is given by Ω = Ωu +Ωe.
Note that the firm’s expected steady state profit flow in each market equals the hiring rate times
the expected profit per new hire. When offering wu to an unemployed worker a firm makes
Ωu(wu) =
[
λδ
(δ + λ)
] [
(p− wu)
δ + λ(1− Fe(wu))
]
. (6)
Since λ [Nu(w−e ) + Ne(w−e )] describes the firm’s hiring rate, (4) and (5) imply the expected steady
state profit flow in the market of employed workers when offering we is given by
Ωe(we) =
⎡⎣ λ2Fu(w−e )µ
δ + λ(1− Fe(w−e ))
+
λ2
∫ w−e
wu
[Fe(w
−
e )− Fe(x)]dNu(x)
δ + λ(1− Fe(w−e ))
⎤⎦ [ p− we
δ + λ(1− Fe(we))
]
.
(7)
Having specified the firms’ and workers’ decision problems lets now turn to define and analyse
equilibrium.
5 Market Equilibrium
DEFINITION: A Market Equilibrium is defined by a triple {wr, Fu, Fe} such that
a) Given a wr, a pair of wage offer distributions {Fu, Fe} consistent with the steady state constant
profit condition
Ωi = Ωi(wi) for all wi in the support of Fi, (8)
Ωi ≥ Ωi(wi) otherwise, for each i = u, e.
b) Given a pair {Fu, Fe} , wr satisfies (3).
rules out the possibility that these workers accept employment and quit in the future to be re-hired by the same firm
under a more generous wage. Although a possibility in the decision theory of a firm, it will be shown that in equilibrium
this never happens.
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First we show that for any given wr such that p > wr there exists a unique equilibrium offer
distribution for each market and that these can be fully characterised. Note that if wr ≥ p neither
markets would open and any analysis would be trivial.9 We will show later, however, that in
equilibrium firms make positive expected steady state profits in each market and so the restriction
imposed on wr is not binding.
CLAIM 1: Given a wr < p, any market equilibrium implies p > we ≥ wu and we ≥ wu ≥ wr.
Proof: See Appendix.
Claim 1 shows that given there are positive match rents, in equilibrium firms can always make
positive profits in each market. The next result establishes that any equilibrium wage offer distri-
bution Fe exhibits no mass points and has connected support. That is, in equilibrium there is no
positive measure of firms offering the same wage to employed workers and all firms offer some
wage we ∈ [we, we] .
CLAIM 2: Given a wr < p, any equilibrium Fe is continuous and has connected support.
Proof: See Appendix.
This proof follows closely the one used in B-M. It relies on showing that if Fe is discontinuous
at w˜e or that has a support which is not connected between [we1,we2], a firm offering w˜e or we2
can always post a different wage such that it strictly increases its profits. In the former case this
deviation is possible because the firm’s hiring rate exhibits a discontinuous jump at w˜e, while the
profit per worker is continuous around w˜e. In the latter case, a profitable deviation is possible since
Fe is constant between [we1,we2]. As both situations contradict the constant profit condition (8),
9 If wr = p all firms will make zero profits in both markets and again the analysis would be trivial.
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the implied Fe cannot be an equilibrium. We now establish a crucial result: any positive measure
of firms will offer different wages to unemployed and employed workers; i.e. wu = we, such that
we > wu.
PROPOSITION 1: Given a wr < p, any market equilibrium implies we ≥ wu ≥ wr.
Proof: See Appendix.
This result relies on showing that if the supports of Fu and Fe overlap such that we ≥ wu >
we ≥ wu, a firm offering we = wu to an employed worker will make strictly greater profits than a
firm offering we = we in the same market. The main point is that under the overlapping supports
assumption, the Fe derived from (6) using the constant profit condition cannot be an equilibrium
offer distribution as it has a constant density. As shown by B-M, worker’s on-the-job search implies
any equilibrium distribution Fe must have an increasing and convex density. It is only in this case
that firms can achieve equal steady state profit flow by trading-off expected profits per new hire
with their hiring rate.
Given Proposition 1, it is now easy to characterise the equilibrium distribution functions Fu
and Fe. First, Claim 3 shows that when firms use information on employment status as part of
their recruitment strategies, the Diamond outcome (Diamond (1971)) emerges in the market for
unemployed workers.
CLAIM 3: Given a wr < p, in any equilibrium Fu is degenerate at wr.
Proof: See Appendix.
Note this result follows from the fact that firms in the unemployed workers’ market have a
constant hiring rate, λµ, and workers will leave these firms as soon as they receive an outside
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offer. The optimal strategy for all firms is then to offer the worker’s reservation wage. Next Claim
4 shows that for any wr < p the market for employed workers is described by the B-M outcome.
CLAIM 4: Given a wr < p, there exists a unique equilibrium Fe such that it is described by the
B-M wage offer distribution
Fe(we) =
(
δ + λ
λ
)⎡⎣1− (p− we
p− we
)1/2⎤⎦ , (9)
where the infimum of the support we = wr and the supremum is given by
we = p− (p− wr)[δ/(δ + λ)]2
Proof: See Appendix.
Since a poaching firm does not observe the details of a worker’s contract (i.e. the wage he is
earning and hence the identity of his current employer), it offers the same wage to all employed
workers. Equilibrium then implies any firm trades-off profit per worker with the size of its labour
force. As in B-M, a non-degenerate offer distribution then arises.
Up to this point we have shown that for any wr < p, the constant profit condition implies there
exists a unique Fu(. | wr) and Fe(. | wr) such that the former is degenerate at wr and the latter
satisfies (9). Hence, part (a) of the definition of a market equilibrium has been satisfied. Lets
now turn to part (b) and show that these Fi are such that wr satisfies (3). First note that both the
continuity of Fe and (1) imply Vu(wr) = Ve(we). Using Claim 3 and integrating by parts, (3) can
be expressed as
b− wr =
∫ we
wr
1− Fe(x)
δ + λ(1− Fe(x))dx. (10)
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Furthermore, by substituting out Fe and we using Claim 4 and then integrating, the unique equi-
librium reservation wage is given by
wr =
b(1 + λ/δ)2 − p(λ/δ)2
1 + 2(λ/δ)
. (11)
Since p > b by assumption and (11) implies b > wr the existence of equilibrium is then guaranteed.
Firms make strictly positive expected steady state profit flow in both markets and wi ≥ wr. Also
note that (11) implies workers face a foot-in-the-door effect. They will accept a wage below the
value of leisure (or UI payments) to have the possibility of moving up the wage ladder in the
future. Moreover, it is easy to show that unemployed workers will accept a negative wage if
p/b > [(δ + λ)/λ]2 .
Hence there exists a unique market equilibrium
{
wEr , F
E
u , F
E
e
}
in which firms maximise ex-
pected steady state profit flows by offering a different wage to unemployed and employed such
that FEu (wEr ) = 1 and FEe is given by (9) and workers maximise expected lifetime utility using a
reservation wage strategy where wEr is given by (11).
6 Interpretation and Comparative Statics
To further develop the intuition of our results lets compare them with those found in similar ver-
sions of the B-M and PV-R frameworks. First we analyse the reservation wages derived from these
models. In the B-M and PV-R frameworks they are wB−Mr = b and wPV−Rr = b− (λ/δ)(p− b); 10
while in our framework wr is given by (11). Comparing these expressions, it is easy to see that
wPV−Rr < w
E
r < w
B−M
r .
10 See Mortensen (2003) chapter 5.
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In the B-M framework, unemployed workers will only accept a wage that is at least as great
as their opportunity cost of employment. In the PV-R framework, however, there is also a foot-in-
the-door effect. Unemployed workers are prepared to accept a wage below b to have a chance of
getting a wage increase via offer matching. In this case they effectively pay for the job when hired
from unemployment. In our case, workers do not get their wages bid up to p when they receive a
second offer. They must slowly make their way up the wage ladder via job shopping. Hence, they
are not prepared to accept as low a wage.
The following Proposition now compares the firm’s total steady state profit flow with the ones
in B-M and PV-R.
PROPOSITION 2: Given the unique market equilibrium
{
wEr , F
E
u , F
E
e
}
, Ω = ΩPV−R > ΩB−M .
Proof: See Appendix.
This is an important result. In our framework, a firm’s information set is restricted to the
workers’ employment status. Contrary to PV-R, the firm does not observe its employees outside
offers nor the wages they where previously earning. However, in both cases firms obtain the same
profits. Why?
First note that in the offer matching case, Bertrand competition in the market of employed
workers drives profits in that market to zero. When firms discriminate by employment status,
competition in the employed workers’ market is not as fierce and firms are able to make posi-
tive profits. However, in both cases all firms offer unemployed workers a wage that makes them
indifferent from staying unemployed forever or becoming employed. This implies that with full
information, firms extract all the match rents, (p − b)/δ, in the market of unemployed workers.
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With information only on employment status, firms can do as well by capturing those rents in two
parts.
To illustrate this consider the least generous firm in the market of employed workers. Total
steady state profits can be expressed as
Ω = λµ
[
p− wEr
δ + λ
+
(
λ
δ + λ
)
p− wEr
δ + λ
]
. (12)
Effectively this firm is then obtaining the discounted sum of expected profit, (p − wEr )/ (δ + λ) ,
from each unemployed worker it hires, where the discount rate is given by λ/ (δ + λ) . Substituting
out for wEr using (11), it is easy to show that (12) is equivalent to λµ, the number of workers
hired from unemployment, times the total match rents, (p − b)/δ. The firm extracts a fraction
[(δ + λ)/(δ + 2λ)] of these rents when it first hires the unemployed and then extracts the rest,
[λ/(δ + 2λ)] , in the employed workers’ market.
Now lets compare the wage distributions. (9) implies the wage offer distribution faced by
employed workers is first order stochastically dominated by the one in B-M. As mentioned in the
introduction, the wage offer distribution in the PV-R homogenous agents case degenerates to a
mixture of two mass points. One at the common reservation wage and the other at the worker’s
marginal productivity. Figure 1 compares the equilibrium wage offer densities derived in the three
models for the case of wPV−Rr > 0.
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Figure 1: Wage offer density functions. A comparison with B-M and PV-R. 
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Not surprisingly, the expected lifetime earnings of unemployed and employed workers are
strictly lower in our case than when firms do not use information on worker’s employment status.
However, the expected lifetime earnings of unemployed and employed workers that were previ-
ously unemployed are the same as in PV-R; i.e. in both cases Vu = U = b/δ. Employed workers
who have accepted at least two job offers are clearly worse off in our case.
Given Gu(wu) = 1, (5) implies that the equilibrium steady state earnings distribution for
employed workers hired from employment is
Ge(we) =
δ
λ
⎡⎣(p− wEr
p− we
)1/2
− 1
⎤⎦ , (13)
where Nu = λδ/(δ + λ)2 and Ne = λ2/(δ + λ)2. As with the offer distribution function, this
earnings distribution is first order stochastically dominated by the one in B-M. The average wage
earned by an employed worker is a weighted average of the expected earnings in each market,
where the weights are given by Ni/(1− µ),
E(w) =
1
(δ + λ)
[
δwEr + λ
∫ we
wEr
[1−Ge(we)]dwe
]
,
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which is smaller than the one found in the B-M framework. The expected wage is also smaller
than the one obtained in a simple version of the PV-R framework. This is because workers are
paid their marginal product when they receive their second offer; while in our framework they
climb the wage ladder more slowly through on-the-job search. As an example, let p = 5, b = 4.5,
δ = 0.01 and λ = 0.1. In this case, wEr = 2.12 and E(w) = 2.57, where in B-M wB−Mr = 4.5 and
E(w)B−M = 4.95 and in PV-R wPV−Rr = −0.5 and E(w)PV−R = 4.5.11
Note that the increased monopsony power enjoyed by firms in this context can be partially
counterbalanced by imposing a legal minimum wage, wmin, or by increasing workers’ UI payments
and hence increasing b.12 In particular, by imposing a wmin > wEr , Figure 1 implies both fu and fe
will shift upwards exhibiting a spike at the minimum wage. Note that if wmin = b the wage offer
density function faced by employed workers would be the same as in the B-M framework. As in
the standard B-M, under both policies worker’s future earnings increase as firms adjust upwards
their posted wage offers.
Finally, note that as frictions increase (λ → 0) Claim 4 and (11) imply both offer distributions
converge to a single mass point at b. That is, the labour market converges to the pure monopsony
case. As frictions disappear (λ → ∞), µ → 0 and (4) implies Nu(.) → 0 for any wu. (5) also
implies Ne(.) → 0 for all we < we and Ne(.) → 1 when we = we. Since we → p when λ → ∞
all workers are then paid their marginal product. The labour market converges to the perfectly
competitive case.
11 Where E(w)B−M = p(λ/(δ + λ)) + b(δ/(δ + λ)) and E(w)PV−R = p(λ/(δ + λ)) + wPV−Rr (δ/(δ + λ)).
12 The opportunity cost of employment, b, is assumed to be the sum of the worker’s value of leisure and any benefits
he receives while unemployed.
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7 Conclusions
The present study has analysed firms’ recruitment strategies in a frictional labour market when they
have information on workers’ employment status. Under these circumstances a firm segments its
labour market in two offering a low wage to unemployed workers and a high wage to employed
workers. We show that this policy makes all workers worse off. The theory presented in this pa-
per suggests an alternative explanation of why unemployed workers are subject to wage scarring
even when their human capital has been unaffected. Imposing a minimum wage or increasing UI
payments will reducing the increased monopsony power of firms by shifting the earning distribu-
tion upward making all workers better off. We also show that this recruitment strategy is payoff
equivalent to the one followed when firms have complete information about workers’ common
reservation wage and outside offers. The latter implies wage dispersion can arise in less anony-
mous labour markets in which firms can verify more information about their potential new recruits,
but ex-ante choose not to match outside offers.
Doeringer and Piore (1971) present evidence showing that in some manufacturing industries
firms segment their labour market in two. In the upper tier firms offer high wages, employment sta-
bility and promotions. The lower tier is characterised by low wages and a high degree of turnover.
This result is consistent with the recruitment strategy followed by firms in our framework. We
argue that search frictions can give an alternative explanation of why a “dual” labour market might
appear within a firm without relying on the existence of differences in monitoring costs between
“good” and “bad” jobs as has been previously assumed. For example, see Albrecht and Vroman
(1992) and Saint-Paul (1996).
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Our model predicts that the offer distribution faced by unemployed workers is degenerate at
their reservation wage, but disperse for the case of employed workers. As in the B-M model
the earnings distribution for workers who have had more than one job will have an increasing
density. B-M and Bontemps, Robin and Van den Berg (2000) have shown that by allowing for
dispersion in firms’ productivity one can obtain an earnings distribution that resemble the one
observe empirically. This is also true in our case. A unique prediction of our model, however, is
the existence of a mass point at the infimum of its support. This implies that if our theory was
to be tested empirically we would expect to observe a bimodal earnings distribution in which the
“humps” are located in the left tail of the distribution. Estimating the predictions of our model is
an issue we leave open for future research.
Finally, in this paper we have assumed firms offer constant wage contracts. Stevens (2004) and
Burdett and Coles (2003) have pointed out that this contract is not an optimal one in the presence
of workers’ on-the-job search. They show that the optimal contract has an increasing wage-tenure
profile such that it reduces workers’ quit probability. This is an important extension of the paper,
however, we also leave it for future research.
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Appendix
Proof of Claim 1:
First note that if wr < p then a firm hiring unemployed workers can always make strictly
positive profits by offering them a wage wu = wr. The constant profit condition (8) then implies
in equilibrium all firms must also make positive profits in this market and hence p > wu. Now
consider a firm hiring employed workers. By offering a wage we = wu + ε < p, where ε > 0 but
arbitrarily small, this firm has a positive hiring rate and makes positive profits. (8) again implies in
equilibrium all firms offering a wage in the support of Fe must make positive profits in this market.
Hence we ≥ wu in equilibrium; otherwise the firm offering the least generous wage to employed
workers cannot hire any worker and makes zero steady state profits in that market. Finally assume
wu > we. (6) then implies offering wu = wu cannot be optimal unless wu = wr. However, since
we ≥ we ≥ wu ≥ wr this implies the required contradiction.‖
Proof of Claim 2:
Fix a wr < p and a Fu.
(a) No mass points: Suppose Fe has a mass point at w˜e ∈ [we, we]. (7) then implies
Ωe(w˜e) =
⎡⎣ λ2Fu(w˜−e )µ
δ + λ[1− Fe(w˜e) + me(w˜e)] +
λ2
∫ w˜−e
wu
[Fe(w˜e)−me(w˜e)− Fe(x)]dNu(x)
δ + λ[1− Fe(w˜e) + me(w˜e)]
⎤⎦
×
[
p− w˜e
δ + λ(1− Fe(w˜e))
]
,
where me(w˜e) is the mass of firms offering exactly w˜e. Note that the hiring rate is continuously
increasing in we and jumps discontinuously at w˜e. As the profit per worker is continuous in we,
this firm can strictly increase profits by offering a wage w′e = w˜e + ε, for ε > 0 arbitrarily small.
The increase in the hiring rate more than offsets the loss in profits per worker. Hence, (8) implies
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the existence of a mass point contradicts the definition of a market equilibrium.
(b) Connected support: Consider the following two cases.
1. we ≥ wu : For any Fu assume the support of Fe is not connected in the region [we1, we2] ,
where we ≤ we1 < we2 ≤ we. Consider a firm offering we2. As Fe does not have a mass point at
we2 and we ≥ wu, (7) implies
Ωe(we2) =
[
µ +
∫ wu
wu
[Fe(we2)− Fe(x)] dNu(x)
] [
λ2(p− we2)
[δ + λ(1− Fe(we2))]2
]
.
This firm can offer a strictly lower wage w′e = we2 − ε > we1, for any ε > 0, and increase its
profits per worker while keeping a constant hiring rate. Hence by deviating to w′e the firm strictly
increases steady state flow profits. This contradicts the definition of a market equilibrium.
2. wu > we : First consider the non overlapping interval [wu, we] . It is easy to see that for
any Fu the same arguments used in part (1) imply the support of Fe must be connected over this
interval. Now consider the overlapping interval [we, wu] . Suppose Fu has connected support and
that the support of Fe is not connected in the region [we1, we2] , where we < we1 < we2 ≤ wu.
Continuity of Fe and (6) imply
Ωu(we2) =
[
λδ
(λ + δ)
] [
(p− we2)
δ + λ(1− Fe(we2))
]
.
This firm can strictly increase profits by offering w′u = we2−ε > we1, for any ε > 0, since by doing
so it increases profits per worker while keeping a constant quit rate. Hence the assumed Fe cannot
be an equilibrium distribution function. Next suppose each Fi do not have connected supports over
the interval [we, wu] and that the support of Fi is not connected in the region [wi1, wi2] . Two further
significant cases arise. First let we < we1 ≤ wu1 < wu2 < we2 ≤ wu. In this case the arguments
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used above to show the support of Fe is connected in the interval [we, wu] when Fu is connected
again apply. Now let we ≤ wu1 < we1 < we2 ≤ wu2 < wu. In this case (7) implies
Ωe(we2) =
[
Fu(w
−
u1)µ +
∫ w−e1
wu
[Fe(we1)− Fe(x)]dNu(x)
] [
λ2(p− we2)
[δ + λ(1− Fe(we1))]2
]
,
This firm can increase profits by offering a wage w′e = we2 − ε > we1, for any ε > 0, as by doing
so it keeps its hiring and quit rate constant and increases profits per worker. It then follows that for
any Fu if wu > we, any Fe must have connected support in any market equilibrium. Combining
the results of (1) and (2) then for any Fu a market equilibrium implies Fe must have connected
support.‖
Proof of Proposition 1:
Fix a wr < p and recall Claim 1 showed that in equilibrium p > we ≥ wu and we ≥ wu ≥ wr.
Now suppose we ≥ wu > we ≥ wu ≥ wr. Note that since Fe has connected support (see Claim 2),
wu lies on its support. The objective is to show that under this condition a firm offering we = wu
makes strictly higher steady state profits than a firm offering we = we. Since this contradicts the
constant profit condition (8) in the market for employed workers, it follows that the definition of
equilibrium implies the supports of Fi are such that we > we ≥ wu ≥ wu.
Step 1: Consider the market for unemployed workers. Note that in any equilibrium the constant
profit condition requires Ωu(wu) = Ωu(wu) = Ωu for any wu in the support of Fu. (6) and Claim
2 then imply a unique and continuous offer distribution
Fe(wu) =
(
δ + λ
λ
)[
1−
(
p− wu
p− wu
)]
, (14)
for all wu in the support of Fu.
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Step 2: Now consider a firm offering the least generous wage to an employed worker, we = we.
Note that for any equilibrium Fe, Claim 2 implies Fe(we) = 0 and hence (7) implies
Ωe(we) = Fu(w
−
e )µ
[
λ2
(δ + λ)2
(p− we)
]
. (15)
Next consider a firm offering we = wu to an employed worker. (7) then implies
Ωe(wu) =
[
λFu(w
−
u )µ + λ
∫ w−u
wu
[Fe(wu)− Fe(x)] dNu(x)
] [
λ(p− wu)
[δ + λ(1− Fe(wu))]2
]
=
[
Fu(w
−
u )µ +
∫ w−u
wu
[Fe(wu)− Fe(x)] dNu(x)
] [
λ2
(δ + λ)2
(p− wu)
(p− wu)(p− wu)
]
,(16)
where the last expression is obtained by substituting out Fe using (14). Inspection establishes that
Ωe(we = wu) > Ωe(we = we). We then have the required contradiction and hence any market
equilibrium implies we ≥ wu.‖
Proof of Claim 3:
Claim 2 and Proposition 1 imply a firm offering wu to an unemployed worker will have a steady
state profit flow given by
Ωu(wu) =
λδ(p− wu)
(δ + λ)2
.
Hence, maximising Ωu requires offering an unemployed worker his reservation wage; i.e. wu =
wr. It then follows from the constant profit condition that any wu = wr in the support of Fu.‖
Proof of Claim 4:
First note that Claim 2 and (7) imply the expected steady state profit in the market for employed
workers of a firm offering we is given by
Ωe(we) =
[
λ2Fu(w
−
e )µ
δ + λ
] [
p− we
δ + λ
]
.
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Since for any wr < p, equilibrium implies we ≥ wu = wr, this firm will maximise steady state
profits in that market by offering the lowest possible wage an employed worker, hired from unem-
ployment, will accept. That is, we = wr + ε where ε > 0 is arbitrarily small. Hence, wr describes
the infimum of the support of Fe. It then follows from the constant profit condition that in the
market for employed workers all firms make steady state profit
Ωe =
λ2µ
(δ + λ)2
(p− wr) = λNu (p− wr)
(δ + λ)
,
where the last equality follows from using (4). Next note that (7), Claim 2 and Proposition 1 imply
Ωe(we) =
[
λ2µ
δ + λ(1− Fe(we)) +
λ2Fe(we)Nu
δ + λ(1− Fe(we))
] [
p− we
δ + λ(1− Fe(we))
]
=
[
λNu(δ + λ)
δ + λ(1− Fe(we))
] [
p− we
δ + λ(1− Fe(we))
]
describes the steady state profit flow in the market for employed workers of a firm offering we.
The last equality again follows from using (4). The constant profit condition then requires that
Ωe(we) = Ωe for any we ∈ [we, we] . Hence, using the above expressions and some manipulations
establish the expression for Fe. Finally, using Ωe(we) = Ωe establish the expression for we.‖
Proof of Proposition 2:
Using (6), (7) and applying the constant profit condition the total expected steady state profit
flow is given by
Ω = Ωu + Ωe =
λδ
δ + λ
[
p− wEr
δ + λ
]
+
λ2δ
(δ + λ)2
[
p− wEr
δ + λ
]
=
λδ
(δ + λ)
[
p− wEr
δ + λ
] [
1 +
λ
δ + λ
]
.
In the B-M case, where firms offer the same wage to all workers, the constant profit condition
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implies that a firm’s steady state profit flow is given by
ΩB−M =
λδ
(δ + λ)
[
p− b
δ + λ
]
.
where the first term is the hiring rate, λµ, and the second the expected profit per new hire. By the
same token, in the PV-R framework once a worker just hired from unemployment receives a job
offer, his wage is bid up to p and the firm makes zero profit. Hence,
ΩPV−R =
λδ
(δ + λ)
[
p− wPV−Rr
δ + λ
]
.
Using the expressions for the respective reservation wages we obtain that Ω = ΩPV−R > ΩB−M .‖
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